American University Washington College of Law

Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of
Law
Upper Level Writing Requirement Research
Papers

Student Works

2022

Game Theory Optimized Fraud: How the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act Created a Virtually Riskless
Environment for White Collar Crime in Online Poker
Jeffrey Woolf

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/stu_upperlevel_papers
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons

GAME THEORY OPTIMIZED FRAUD: HOW THE UNLAWFUL INTERNET
GAMBLING ENFORCEMENT ACT CREATED A VIRTUALLY RISKLESS
ENVIRONMENT FOR WHITE COLLAR CRIME IN ONLINE POKER
Bye, bye to poker online,
Drove my credit to the limit, now my bank account has run dry,
And to them good old days of winning with Ace-King high
before 2011, April 1-5,
when DOJ brought an end to poker online.
Or did it?
INTRODUCTION1
Public corruption, money laundering, securities and commodities fraud, financial institution
fraud, bank fraud and embezzlement, and fraud against the government are just some of the criminal
activity that fits into the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) scope of white-collar criminal
activity.2 The common thread for these, and other white-collar crimes, is that they are financially
motivated for the purpose “to obtain or avoid losing money, property, or services or to secure a
personal or business advantage.” 3
In a 2002 report examining Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) data, the FBI found that
computer equipment criminal offenses accounted for forty two-percent of white-collar offenses, with
larceny-theft comprising the most significant proportion of those offenses. 4 Twenty years later, vast
improvements in technology have provided tech-savvy fraudsters with the means and methods to
execute more complex schemes that are more efficient and harder to detect. While technological
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advances present a constantly evolving criminal theater, statutory challenges, such as ambiguity,
have remained a persistent challenge in white-collar crime prosecution. 5 In white-collar criminal
cases, whether a crime occurred turns on a careful examination of fact and law. 6 White-collar
criminal cases where fraud is suspected often leave questions about “whether criminal intent was
formed by the [suspected] perpetrator.” 7 Sometimes, the courts may be the root cause of ambiguity.
In Cheek v. United States,8 the Court held that even though ignorance of the law is generally not a
defense to a criminal charge, proving willfulness as an element of a crime requires “the Government
[to] prove the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of [t]his duty, and that
[the defendant] voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty.” 9 The Court also held that whether
or not objectively reasonable, a good-faith misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that
one is not violating the law negates willfulness. 10 Here, the Court appeared to suggest that one can
be ignorant of the law and still be accountable for the crime, but no matter how ridiculous the excuse
may be, truly believing that one is doing nothing wrong is enough to negate the notion that someone
willfully broke the law.
Ambiguity may also arise when statutory definitions create it. 11 In Dowling v. United States,
the defendant was convicted for mail fraud, interstate transportation of stolen property, and
conspiracy to transport stolen property interstate. 12 In reversing Dowling’s convictions, the Court
noted that “assessing the reach of a federal criminal statute requires paying close heed to language,
legislative history, and purpose in order to strictly determine the scope of the conduct the enactment
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forbids.”13 When “interpreting a criminal statute that does not explicitly reach the conduct in
question, [the Court is] reluctant to base an expansive reading on inferences drawn from subjective
and variable ‘understandings.’”14 Because the language in the statute did not concern itself with
interstate shipments of bootleg and pirated sound recordings, it did not “plainly and unmistakably”
cover Dowling’s conduct.15
While white-collar criminal investigations often, and somewhat necessarily, put the cart
before the horse—connecting a person to potentially criminal activity versus connecting criminal
facts to the suspect—prosecuting white-collar criminal cases still requires proving beyond a
reasonable doubt each element of the crime alleged. In some instances, the law’s statutory construct
significantly lowers the Government’s burden. Because the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act16 (UIGEA) only requires proving the financial transactions in question were
processed for the purpose of online gambling,17 it deters the online poker sites from reporting
fraudulent acts to authorities, creating an ideal playground for other forms of criminal activity.
PURPOSE
The following discussion explores how the UIGEA created an environment that encourages
bad actors to engage in white-collar criminal activities such as wire fraud, money laundering, and
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO)-like criminal activity in an
environment virtually free from the fear of prosecution. Through a critical examination of the UIGEA
and Department of Justice’s April 15, 2011, assault on online poker sites, the reader will see how the
UIGEA provides online scammers the opportunity to implement technology as an artifice to defraud
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unsuspecting online poker players. Now that several states have legalized online poker, this paper
suggests ways to amend the UIGEA to better protect U.S.-based online poker players from fraud.
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission (NGISC) recommended Congress
pass legislation prohibiting wire transfers related to Internet gambling sites and the banks that
represented them.18 The NGISC based its recommendation on findings that Internet gambling was a
“growing cause of debt collection problems for insured depository institutions and the consumer
credit industry because it was primarily funded through personal use of payment system instruments,
credit cards, and wire transfers.”19 The report also noted that ambiguity in the current law raised
questions on the applicability of the Wire Act20 to Internet gambling, including whether “the specific
mention of ‘sports wagering’ and ‘contests’ include[d] all types of gambling on the Internet.” 21
Central to the debate over the original intent of the statute and the future of technology was the
applicability of the phrase “wired communications.”22 The first argument asked whether the law’s
intent only applied to telephone communication because the Internet had not yet been invented. 23
The argument for including the Internet in the statute’s reach was based on the idea that even though
Congress did not write “telephone communications” into the Wire Act, the intent was to include “any
and all wire communication devices.” 24 This interpretation sought to solve whether the Wire Act
would still apply should the information on the Internet “pass through most computers without any
hardwire connection at all.”25 The second argument was over the forms of gambling the Wire Act
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applied to because there was no clear definition of “contest.”26 Both positions fail under Dowling
because they argue to extend the statute to cover bodies of law that Congress had not intended it to
touch.27 The “time-honored interpretive guideline [is] that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of
criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’”28 Therefore, simply applying the law
arbitrarily would violate precedent.
Moreover, honoring the interpretive guideline would virtually repeal the Wire Act as Internet
gambling became more mainstream. Therefore, the NGISC called for “[n]ew mechanisms of
enforcing gambling laws on the Internet” because “traditional enforcement mechanisms are often
inadequate for enforcing gambling prohibitions or regulations on the Internet, especially where such
gambling crosses state or national borders.” 29 Congress responded by “hastily tack[ing] [the UIGEA]
onto the end of unrelated legislation.”30 And on October 13, 2006, Congress passed the Security and
Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Act) 31 and the UIGEA with it.
How the UIGEA filled the gaps in the Wire Act during the Internet era becomes apparent
when comparing each statute’s prohibited acts. Under the Wire Act, “[w]hoever being engaged in
the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the
transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers” commits the crime of wire fraud. 32 Whereas the UIGEA prohibits a person
engaged in the business of betting or wagering “to knowingly accept in connection with the
participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling,” credit or the proceeds of credit,
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electronic fund transfers, checks, or the proceeds of any form of a financial transactions. 33 Unlike
the Wire Act, the UIGEA focuses on the process of accepting or transmitting funds for gambling; it
does not make the act of betting illegal. Almost two years after its enactment, the difference between
the Wire Act prohibited acts and those included in the UIGEA played a significant role in bringing
an apparent end to online poker in the United States.
DISCUSSION
On the morning of April 15, 2011, thirty-six days after a Grand Jury in the Southern District
of New York returned an indictment34 charging Full Tilt Poker, Absolute Poker/UltimateBet, and
PokerStars (collectively the “Poker Companies”), U.S.-based online poker players logging into their
Full Tilt Poker, Absolute Poker/UltimateBet, and PokerStars accounts learned the Department of
Justice (DOJ) had taken control of the Internet addresses and froze the bank accounts attached to the
sites35—including a reported hundreds of millions of dollars in player funds 36—under suspicion the
Poker Companies engaged in criminal activity.37 On what is known to those in the poker community
as “Black Friday,” DOJ executed a sweeping effort to scrub online poker from the Internet in the
United States, seizing the aforementioned online poker sites—and reportedly hundreds of millions
of dollars in player funds—under suspicion the Poker Companies engaged in criminal activity. 38 The
indictment charged the principals of the Poker Companies, including Raymond Bitar (“Bitar”) and
Nelson Burtnick (“Burtnick”) of Full Tilt Poker; Scott Tom (“Tom”) and Brent Beckley (“Beckley”)
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of Absolute Poker; Isai Scheinberg (“Scheinberg”); and Paul Tate (“Tate”) of PokerStars
(collectively the “Poker Principals”), as well as some of the highly compensated third-party payment
processors, including Ryan Lang (“Lang”), Bradley Franzen (“Franzen”), Ira Rubin (“Rubin”), Chad
Elie (“Elie”), and John Campos (“Campos”) (collectively the “Poker Processors”) with UIGEA
conspiracy.39
DOJ alleged the Poker Companies “received billions of dollars from United States residents
who gambled through the Poker Companies” because the Poker Principals conspired with the Poker
Processors to disguise payments to the websites as being made to non-existent online merchants and
other non-gambling businesses. 40 Working together, the Poker Companies and Poker Processors:
deceived United States banks and financial institutions – including
banks insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation – into
processing billions of dollars in gambling transactions for the Poker
Companies . . . [with] [a]pproximately one-third or more of the funds
deposited by gamblers [going] directly to the Poker Companies as
revenue through the ‘rake’ the Poker Companies charged players on
almost every poker hand played online.41
Because Internet gambling companies, like the Poker Companies, are not permitted to open
bank accounts in the United States to receive proceeds from U.S. gamblers, the Defendants employed
various deceptive methods to trick banks into processing the gambling-related transactions. 42 One
scheme used dummy companies to circumvent the regulations Visa and Mastercard introduced in
2001, requiring member banks to apply a specific transaction code to Internet gambling
transactions.43 The dummy companies created the false appearance that the transactions were
unrelated to gambling, tricking the banks into miscoding the transactions and allowing the payments
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to process.44 A second scheme involved using pre-paid credit cards developed to look like “store
value cards” that were then funded by credit card without the transaction code being applied. 45
A third scheme used e-checks as the artifice to carry out the fraud. 46 Between 2007 and March
2009, one e-check provider, Australia-based Intabill, processed $543,210,092 of transactions for the
Poker Companies.47 The scheme was particularly effective because Intabill sought out banks
struggling as a result of the global banking crisis. In one instance, Intabill’s U.S-based representative,
Andrew Thornhill (“Thornhill”), and Elie approached Campos, the then-Vice-Chairman of the Board
of Directors and part-owner of SunFirst Bank (“SunFirst”) in Saint George, Utah, and proposed to
Campos that SunFirst process poker transactions in exchange for a $10M investment into the bank. 48
Despite warnings from SunFirst’s attorneys that processing the payments could lead to prosecution
or seizure and forfeiture, Campos finalized the deal.49 Between September 2009 and November 2010,
SunFirst earned approximately $1.6M in revenue from the processing fees connected to more than
$200M in payments made to the Poker Companies.
In all, the Indictment charged nine counts. Both the Poker Companies and the Poker
Processors were charged with violating the UIGEA and operating an illegal gambling business. The
Poker Processors were charged with conspiracy to violate the UIGEA and conspiracy to commit
bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering. 50
Wire fraud, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (“Section 1343”), is the act of:
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“devis[ing] or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or
for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, transmits or causes to be to be
transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs, signals, pictures,
or sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice.” 51
The bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (“Section 1344”), states that it is illegal for an individual
to “knowingly execute[ ], or attempt[ ] to execute, a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial
institution” or to “obtain any of the money, funds, credits, assets, securities, or other property owned
by, or under the custody or control of, a financial institution, by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises.”52 Though wire fraud and bank fraud are distinct statutes,
the latter usually relies on the former to effect the fraud.
The bank fraud charges against the Poker Companies and Poker Processors were based on
the scheme to use dummy companies to mask the nature of the gambling-related transactions by
making the transactions appear to be connected to other online merchants. 53 For example, the Poker
Processors “processed credit card payments for gambling transactions under the name ‘PS3SHOP,’
using a non-gambling credit card code for the transactions.” 54 The use of the wires was critical to the
execution of the bank fraud scheme because the Poker Processors used wire communications,
including the Internet, to willfully and knowingly “deceive financial institutions and other financial
intermediaries into processing and authorizing the payments” by creating a “false appearance [that
the payments] were unrelated to gambling.” 55
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DOJ charged conspiracy to commit bank and wire fraud under statute 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349
(“Section 1349”).56 Under Section 1349, “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any
offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense,
the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy. 57 In New York—where the
illegal gambling operations took place—New York State Law § 105.20 requires an independent overt
act in furtherance of the conspiracy. 58 Indicting for the federal crime of conspiracy charged under
Section 1349, however, does not require proof of an overt act; federal conspiracy charges only
require a defendant to join in the agreement willfully with the intent to further its unlawful purpose. 59
Section 1349 significantly lowers the bar for prosecution because the Government only has to prove
that two or more persons agreed to commit an offense.
Count Nine against the Defendants was money laundering, 18 U.S.C.A. §1956. 60 Money
laundering is the process of making dirty money look clean. 61 Charging under this statute speaks to
a basic tenant of American jurisprudence: “criminal liability is normally based upon the concurrence
of two factors, an evil-meaning mind [, the mens rea], and an evil-doing hand [, the actus reus].”62
The actus reus for money laundering is an attempted financial transaction involving the proceeds of
criminal activity.63 Two distinct types of activity can serve as the actus reus for money laundering:
the first act is where the suspect knows “the property involved in the financial transaction represents
the proceeds of some form of unlawful activity” and still “attempts to conduct such a financial

56

18 U.S.C.A. § 1349 (West 2018).
Id.
58
N.Y. Penal Law § 105.20 (McKinney 2022).
59
“The language of § 1349 does not require the commission of an overt act.” United States v. Gonzalez, 834 F.3d 1206,
1220 (11th Cir. 2016) (comparing 18 U.S.C.A. § 371 with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1349).
60
18 U.S.C.A. § 1956 (West 2018).
61
History of Anti-Money Laundering Laws, FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, https://www.fincen.gov/historyanti-money-laundering-laws (last visited Apr. 3, 2022).
62
United States v. Thompson, 81 M.J. 824, 825 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394,
402 (1980)).
63
§ 1956.
57

10

transaction which involves the proceeds of specified unlawful activity.” 64 The second act is where
the suspect “transports, transmits, or transfers, or attempts to transport, transmit, or transfer a
monetary instrument or funds” from inside the United States “to or through a place outside the United
States or to a place inside the United States from or through a place outside the United States.” 65 The
actus reus for money laundering requires that the funds represent the “proceeds of specified unlawful
activity.”66 Specified unlawful activity covers “over 250 crimes in six categories, including most
RICO predicate offenses; certain offenses against foreign nations; acts constituting a criminal
enterprise under the Controlled Substances Act; miscellaneous offenses against persons and
property; federal health offenses and federal environmental offenses. 67 For money to represent the
proceeds of a specified unlawful activity, the underlying criminal action must be complete. 68
The base acts alone are not sufficient to prosecute money laundering; there must be a mens
rea—the evil purpose for the transaction or attempted transaction. The mens rea is expressed through
the intent of the transaction. If the intent is to “promote the carrying on of specified criminal activity”
or to engage in conduct constituting tax fraud or evasion, the crime is charged under Section
1956(a)(1)(A)69 or Section 1956(a)(2)(A),70 or both, as promotional money laundering. If the intent
is to “conceal or disguise the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the
proceeds of specified unlawful activity”; or to “avoid a transaction reporting requirement under State

64

§ 1956(a)(1).
§ 1956(a)(2).
66
§ 1956(a)(1).
67
Money Laundering Control Act (MCLA) Overview, WILKIE FARR & GALLAGHER,
https://complianceconcourse.willkie.com/resources/anti-money-laundering-us-money-laundering-control-act (last
visited Apr. 3, 2022).
68
Id.
69
§ 1956(a)(1)(A).
70
§ 1956(a)(2)(A).
65

11

or Federal law,” the crime is charged under Section 1956(a)(1)(B) 71 or 1956(a)(2)(B),72 or both, as
concealment money laundering.
The Poker Processors were indicted for conspiring to commit promotional money
laundering—to continue operating illegal gambling businesses 73—under both Section 1956 and 18
U.S.C.A. § 1957 (“Section 1957”). 74 Charging under both statutes was addition by subtraction.
Section 1957 money laundering removes the requirement to prove a defendant knew the funds were
derived from a specified unlawful activity, even if the predicate offense occurred outside the United
States, as long as the Defendants were United States persons.75 In the Black Friday case, charging
money laundering under both Section 1956 and Section 1957 ensured DOJ would have jurisdiction
even though the unlawful activity occurred in the Isle of Mann (PokerStars), Ireland (Full Tilt Poker),
Antigua (UltimateBet), and Costa Rica (Absolute Poker)—because the Poker Processors were U.S.
residents.76
Additionally, the Defendants faced the likelihood of significantly longer prison sentences if
they were convicted of bank fraud, wire fraud, and money laundering than just a UIGEA conviction
would allow. Under Section 5366 of the UIGEA, “[a]ny person who violates section 5363 shall be
fined under title 18, imprisoned for not more than [five] years, or both.” 77 “Title 18” references 18
USCA § 3571,78 which provides guidelines for “fines for individuals,” not more than $250,000, and
“fines for organizations,” not to exceed $500,000, found guilty of a felony under the statute. 79 By
comparison, the punishment for bank and wire fraud is a fine of not more than $1,000,000,
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imprisonment for not more than [twenty] years, or both.80 Convictions for money laundering are
punishable by a fine of not more than $500,000 or twice the value of the property involved in the
transaction, whichever is greater, imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or both. 81
Many policymakers and practitioners believe that a more severe prison experience may make
individuals convicted of an offense less likely to commit crimes in the future. 82 However, studies
show that the likelihood of getting caught is a greater deterrent than a lengthy prison sentence, doing
more to “chasten individuals convicted of crimes” than does the risk of severe punishment. 83 This is
likely because “[c]riminal justice today is, for the most part, a system of pleas, not a system of
trials.”84 In a system of bargained justice, the threat of lengthy incarceration is a valuable commodity
because the prospect of spending decades in prison gives DOJ leverage to secure pleas from
defendants in exchange for more lenient sentences. Facing decades in prison if convicted by a jury,
two Poker Principals85 and three Poker Processors86 entered guilty pleas.
The rise in online poker’s popularity and its fall under the UIGEA
The 1999 NGISC report attributed the Internet gambling phenomenon to the increasing
number of Internet users and their growing consumer confidence in conducting online financial
80

§§ 1343 and 1344.
§ 1956.
82
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83
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84
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transactions.87 By the early 2000s, Internet poker was available to practically anyone with a modem
and a computer. Within five years, more than 70% of the 1.8 million players logging into their online
poker accounts were located in the United States.88 The online poker boom in the United States
arguably came to an end when the UIGEA passed in 2006.89 PartyGaming shares plummeted 13%
overnight after analysts forecasted a 90% revenue drop attributed to the loss of access to the U.S.
player pool.90 Despite the bill passing, some online poker sites, including the Poker Companies
continued to operate until April 15, 2011.91 Today, only a few online poker websites accept U.S.
players. One site, America’s Cardroom (“ACR”), a subsidiary of Winning Poker Network based in
Costa Rica, ranks seventh in the world for online poker traffic. 92 ACR offers a variety of payment
methods ranging from cryptocurrency to standard Visa card payments. 93 Like the Poker Companies
once did, ACR operates offshore; however, the presumption of extraterritoriality—a canon of
statutory construction where “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal
laws will be construed to have only domestic application”94—impedes DOJ’s enforcement of the
UIGEA against online poker sites operating outside the United States.
Extraterritorial application of U.S. law is evaluated under the Morrison–Kiobel framework—
a two-step analysis originating from two seminal cases: Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.95
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and Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.96 Under the Morrison – Kiobel framework, the Court asks
whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially. 97 If there is a
clear extraterritorial effect, the analysis turns to what limits Congress imposed on the statute’s foreign
application.98 If there is no clear extraterritorial effect, the Court moves to the second step, examining
the statute’s “focus.”99 “If the conduct relevant to the statute’s focus occurred in the United States,
then the case involves a permissible domestic application even if [the conduct] occurred abroad.” 100
Courts do not necessarily have to start the analysis at step one; they may opt to start their analysis at
step two when it is appropriate; however, because a “finding of extraterritoriality at step one will
obviate step two’s ‘focus’ inquiry, it will usually be preferable for courts to proceed with the twostep Morrison – Kiobel framework sequentially.”101
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court implemented the Morrison – Kiobel framework in United
States v. Hussain, a wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud case. 102 Hussain argued on
appeal that his convictions for wire fraud and conspiracy to commit wire fraud must be reversed
because they were based on the improper application of US criminal law to conduct abroad. 103 The
Court held that “[s]o long as Hussain’s use of the wires in furtherance of his fraud had a sufficient
domestic nexus,” the convictions were based on “permissible domestic application[s]” of the
statute.104 Specific to its decision, the Court held that because “the focus of the wire fraud statute is
the use of the wires in furtherance of a scheme to defraud,” and not the “scheme to defraud,” as
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Hussain argued, the convictions were proper as Hussain used domestic wires to further his
extraterritorial scheme.105
The Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Hussain is instructive for explaining why ACR and online
poker sites that operate offshore are willing to accept U.S. players and why the UIGEA creates a
significant hurdle for bringing those sites within reach of U.S. law enforcement. First, Internet
gambling sites outside the United States, like ACR, obtain licenses from Antigua, the Isle of Man,
and other foreign jurisdictions.106 Second, 31 USCA § 5361 Note (“Sec. 803”) addresses “Internet
gambling in or through foreign jurisdictions,” stating the United States Government should:
(1) encourage cooperation by foreign governments and relevant
international fora in identifying whether Internet gambling operations
are being used for money laundering, corruption, or other crimes.
(2) advance policies that promote the cooperation of foreign
governments, through information sharing or other measures, in the
enforcement of this Act.107
Suppose ACR implemented a similar scheme to trick banks into processing transactions as
the Poker Companies employed. In that instance, a court starting at the second step would find the
fraud satisfies the Morrison-Kiobel framework’s “focus-centric” analysis for extraterritorial
application because the core component of the scheme to defraud occurred in the United States. If
the same court proceeded through the Morrison-Kiobel framework analysis sequentially, first
examining whether Congress intended for the UIGEA to apply extraterritorially, and if so, with what
limitations, the outcome differs significantly. In that instance, it is likely the court would find the
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UIGEA lacks extraterritorial application because Sec. 803 specifically addresses Congress’s intent
for the UIGEA’s application outside the United States.
The lack of apparent extraterritorial application and the focus on holding only financial
processors and website owners accountable created an optimal environment for tech savvy cheaters
to rob online U.S.-based online poker players. First, it disincentivized online poker sites to do
anything about terms of service violations that reach the level of criminal activity because they would
have to self-report their own criminal activity. Second, the unwillingness for online poker sites to
self-report coupled with increased accessibility to Real Time Assistance (RTA) software allows bad
actors to take advantage of sites like ACR to scam U.S.-based online poker players without fear of
getting caught. How these components created a highly profitable and virtually risk-free environment
for wire fraud, money laundering, and RICO-like criminal activity is discussed below.
The rise of criminal activity in online poker during the UIGEA era
Poker is a game of decisions. Players decide to check, call, raise, or fold based on their
analysis of available, and often, incomplete information. Game Theory Optimal (GTO) poker is a
strategy that dictates “player[s] [are] always making the decision that returns the most profit in the
long run.”108 Two essential components drive profitable decision-making in poker: expected value
and pot odds. The quality of the decision is measured in expected value (EV)—(EV) is the average
result of a given play if it were made hundreds (or even thousands) of times 109—and the EV of a
decision is derived from a concept referred to as “pot odds.” Pot odds represent the relationship of
what you stand to gain in a hand of poker and what you have to spend in order to get it — that is, the
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ratio between your reward and your risk.110 For poker players who aspire to be profitable over the
long run:
“The goal is to make the highest expected value decision at each
opportunity. Generally, the best way to accomplish this is to focus on
giving our opponents the most difficult decisions possible by using our
understanding of the pot odds model to capture more than our fair
share of each pot.”111
Consistently making the highest expected value decisions that yield the most profit over the long
term is easier said than done. “The foundation of the game of poker is our ability to [consistently]
make good decisions based on that incomplete information,” which “mak[es] gaining and using
information each a skill unto themselves.”112 Because humans are prone to making mistakes, getting
tired, and acting on emotion decisions, it is almost impossible to implement the right decision in a
game where there are “10161 (1 followed by 161 zeroes) situations, or information sets, that a player
may face—vastly more than all of the atoms in the universe.” 113 Fortunately, there’s an app[lication]
for that!114
Real Time Assistance (“RTA”) is “anything that assists a poker player in their decision
making while the player is currently playing in a cash game or a tournament. 115 Using RTA software
influences a player’s decision-making.116 In some cases, the poker software allows users to “data
mine.” “Data mining” involves exploring and analyzing large blocks of information to glean
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meaningful data patterns and trends. 117 Grocery stores, for example, use data mining in loyalty
programs to determine who is buying what and what items to put on sale and when. 118 In online
poker, data mining refers to using software to access hand histories from the players that use the
site.119 The hand history will usually include such information as the date and time the hand was
played; the player seating positions; player identifiers, such as the “Hero,” who is usually the person
keeping the hand history, or the “Villain,” who is usually the primary opponent in the hand history;
the type of game and the table stakes, known hole cards, betting action for each round, and the
community cards in play.120 Poker data mining software allows the user to access this data about all
players on the site.121 The data gleaned from other players gives the user the ability to target specific
players and exploit their weaknesses by determining their capabilities as a player, the likelihood they
will fold to aggressive betting, how often they bluff, and the bet sizing they use when bluffing
compared to when they have strong hands.122 Real Time Assistance helps players implement GTO
strategy, giving users the formula for making the highest EV decision in a particular spot. As long
as users know what data to enter, understanding the game does not matter.
Using RTA software violates the terms of service for many online poker sites because it
violates the basic tenet of poker that is “[f]undamental to the “integrity of the game, ‘one person, one
hand.’”123 Unfortunately, “one person, one hand” is an almost impossible rule to enforce online,
making the use of RTAs an existential threat to online poker. 124 Some online poker sites, such as
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GGPoker, have taken an aggressive stance against cheating. The GGPoker website has an entire
section of its “Security & Ecology Policy (SEP)” devoted to breaches, prohibiting the use of RTAs,
including, but not limited to, the use of real-time assistance (RTA), remote desktop and screen
sharing programs, virtual machines and emulators, and data mining. 125 Players caught using banned
materials face may be permanently banned from the site or have the funds in their accounts
confiscated.126
RTA use became the focus of one of the biggest scandals in online poker since the Full Tilt
Poker Ponzi scheme came to light in the aftermath of Black Friday. 127 In September 2020, Fedor
Kruse was accused of amassing over $90,000 in profit over two weeks by using RTA against players
in online high-stakes cash games on several sites, including ACR. 128 Fedor “GlitchSystem” Kruse
(“Kruse”), a YouTube streamer who amassed more than 400,000 subscribers who watched him live
stream the game “Call of Duty” before he turned his attention to poker in 2015. 129 When Kruse
started playing online poker, he played $0.50/$1.00 No Limit Hold’em 130 (NLHE) cash games,
known as “micro-stakes.”131 Inside of twelve months, Kruse was playing $200/$400 high-stakes
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NLHE cash games.”132 The meteoric rise from micro-stakes to the nose-bleeds 133 inside of one year
is virtually unheard of because of the vast difference in the talent pool and the amount of money a
player needs to absorb the swings that come with playing the game. While there is no bright-line rule
for how much money one needs to play poker, the general rule is that a player should have anywhere
between 20–50 “buy-ins” to absorb the variance inherent to poker. 134 A “buy-in” is the maximum
amount of money a player can start with at that specific game. Generally, the maximum buy-in for
lower limit games is 100 big blinds. To put this into context, the maximum buy-in for most
$0.50/$1.00 NLHE games online is usually $100; thus, the recommended bankroll for $0.50/$1.00
NLHE—where Kruse started his online poker career—is between $2,000–$5,000. 135 By the end of
2015, Kruse was playing at limits that recommend players have between $800,000–$2,000,000 in
their bankroll.
Coupled with what opponents deemed to be “very non-intuitive” solver-approved decisions
in which Kruse employed very exact bet-sizing, German players started to question Kruse’s success
and style of play.136 One day, Kruse’s roommates outed him on the popular Two Plus Two poker
forum.137 His roommates shared an Excel spreadsheet of Kruse’s cash game results for sessions in
which one or both of his roommates had a part of the action. 138 The total hours played across the six
sessions is not presently known. Assuming marathon twelve-hour sessions, Kruse would have logged
only 72 hours of play, winning an astonishing $1,283.44 per hour. Kruse used a two-computer set up
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to run RTA software on one computer while accessing the poker sites on the second computer. 139
Using two computers made it practically impossible for the online poker site’s security and integrity
team to detect what Kruse was doing.140 Had Kruse’s roommates not come forward, it is hard to say
whether Kruse would have ever been exposed.
While cheating at a game may be considered an act of moral turpitude, it is likely Kruse’s
actions rise to the level of white-collar criminal activity. Consider the following elements for wire
fraud: “a scheme or artifice to defraud” for “obtaining money or property by means of fraudulent
pretenses” and “caus[ing] to be transmitted by wire” any writings or signals “for the purpose of
executing such scheme or artifice.”141 Kruse’s actions are prosecutable as wire fraud. First, Kruse
devised a scheme to cheat at online poker with the sole intent being financial gain. Second, to execute
on the scheme, Kruse built a two-computer set up specifically to run the RTA software undetected. 142
Third, Kruse implemented the scheme and artifice to defraud and made sure he evaded detection by
running the software on a computer that was not linked to the same network, demonstrating that he
knew he was doing something untoward. Fourth, Kruse “caused” the transmitting of data—the hand
histories—from the poker site to another electronic destination, where he entered the information
into the solver that relayed the information back to him on what the most profitable action to take
was for executing his scheme. It is impossible to know how many times Kruse implemented this
scheme without access to all of the hand histories. A typical live nine-handed poker game will see
about 25-30 hands per hour.143 The same game played online will deal 60-80 hands per hour.144
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Kruse was likely playing six-max (a six-player maximum table), which will deal 75-100 hands per
hour.145 Therefore, he could have efficiently executed this scheme hundreds of times per hour over
the six recorded sessions.
The Excel spreadsheet shows that one or both of Kruse’s roommates bought equity stakes in
Kruse’s action for almost all recorded sessions between May 12, 2020, and May 26, 2020. 146 Buying
another player’s action,” more commonly known as “backing” a player, is when someone agrees to
cover a portion of the player’s buy-in in exchange for a respective share of any profit from the
session.147 One driver for selling action is to defray some of the costs of playing, allowing a player
to sit at bigger games where the potential for making more money is higher but may also be too much
for the player to afford on their own. On May 25, 2020, Kruse bought into the game for $10,000 and
cashed out of the game for $25,139—a $15,139 profit. 148 That day, one of the roommates bought
60% of Kruse’s action and received a $9,083.40 profit in return for the risk of backing him. 149
Backing a player is an investment that carries risk. Having confidence that the investment will return
a profit is important, begging the question as to what gave Kruse’s roommates the confidence to back
him in a game that big and after on a short time playing poker.
It is unclear whether Kruse’s roommates knew he was using RTA software to defraud players.
If they did know about the scheme, it is arguable they were co-conspirators in a RICO-like operation
and not just Kruse’s backers. Though this may explain their sudden change of heart after realizing
how the scheme had escalated,150 their participation raises the specter of what if any culpability they
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may have had in the Kruse’s scheme to defraud players. Outside of the strong likelihood that they
conspired to commit wire fraud, there may have been a more significant criminal statute in play.
The RICO Act, § 18 U.S.C. § 1962,151 makes it unlawful for any person to receive any income
derived, directly or indirectly, through a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire or [conspire to]
maintain directly or indirectly, an interest in or control of any enterprise,” or “to be [or conspire to
be] associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign
commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
through a pattern of racketeering activity.”152
Elements common to all RICO claims are a RICO person, an enterprise, and a pattern of
racketeering activity.153 A RICO person is defined as an “individual or entity capable of holding a
legal or beneficial interest in property.”154 An enterprise is defined to include “any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
associated in fact although not a legal entity.155 “On its face, the definition [of an enterprise] appears
to include both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises with its scope.” 156 Whether legitimate or
illegitimate, “an enterprise includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact,” including
“a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.” 157
“Such [a RICO] enterprise is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal,
and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.” 158
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Racketeering activity is defined in Section 1961(1) as any act involving gambling, 159 or any
act which is indictable under Section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), or which is indictable under
Section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses). 160 Racketeering activity
that rises to the level of a “pattern of racketeering activity” requires “at least two acts of racketeering
activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [of the statute] and the last of
which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a
prior act of racketeering activity.”161
In H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., the Court scrutinized how “pattern” should be interpreted
for the purpose of determining what Congress intended “patterns of racketeering activity” to
include.162 The Court held that a “pattern is not formed by sporadic activity.” 163 Patterns of activity
require “showing a relationship between the predicates” and “the threat of continuing activity.” 164
Therefore, proving a pattern of racketeering activity, requires showing the racketeering predicates
are related, and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity.” 165 Criminal conduct forms
a pattern when it “embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are related by distinguishing characteristics and are
not isolated events.”166 Continuity is “both a closed and open-ended concept that refers to a closed
period of repeated conduct or past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of
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repetition.”167 As such, repeat activity is not necessarily continued activity that falls within the statute
if it continues over a few weeks or months but threatens no future criminal conduct. 168
Analyzing the Kruse scandal under the RICO statute indicates behavior that appears to satisfy
the elements of RICO. First, they engaged in at least two acts of gambling that were separated by
less than ten years that may pose a threaten of repetition in the future. 169 Second, the presence of a
RICO person element is satisfied as Kruse and his roommates are people capable of holding a legal
or beneficial interest in property.170 Third, though they are not legally formed, Kruse and his
roommates constitute are a group formed for the “common purpose of engaging in a course of
conduct.”171 That at least one of the roommates added their proceeds to “net worth” 172 may further
the “common purpose” component of RICO because it suggests the proceeds of the activity, if
determined to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity, were reinvested in the enterprise or used
to gain an interest in an enterprise that would continue engaging in that course of conduct.
Under a plain text interpretation of the statute, Kruse and his roommates acted in a manner
consistent with RICO; however, as the Court held in H.J. Inc., Congress intended for RICO to
address long-term criminal conduct.173 The Excel spreadsheet only provides enough information to
prove Kruse and his roommates engaged in a pattern of behavior for few weeks. 174 Without additional
evidence that this pattern of racketeering activity continued for more than what is shown in the Excel
spreadsheet, it is likely the Kruse scandal falls short of satisfying the elements of a RICO charge.
However, it is hard to fathom how a scheme executed at least six times, that implements an “advanced
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game theory optimal (GTO) solver running on a super-computer, capable of running hands millions
of times in a matter of seconds, making decisions based on its findings a split second before the time
limit expires”175 is something less than wire fraud. If the pattern were to continue for an extended
period of time, it would almost certainly satisfy the common elements for RICO prosecution.
The Kruse scandal revealed the existence of RICO-like enterprises in the world of online
poker. Unfortunately for the majority of poker players, there is no way to know at what scale Kruselike scams occur because online poker sites are reluctant to report these types of scams unless it
affects their bottom line. “Like it or not, this is the way forward [in] online [poker]” because “[t]here
is no policing this strategy [and] money tends to win over ethics.” 176
Like the Poker Processors and Poker Companies charged with promotional money laundering
conspiracy, similar charges can be levied against Fedor Kruse as his roommates. The broad definition
of specified unlawful activity includes “any act or activity constituting an offense listed in Section
1961(1).”177 Section 1961(1) lists a variety of acts that fall under the definition of racketeering
activity, including but not limited to transmitting gambling information and wire fraud. In the Kruse
scandal. the roommates’ participation in the apparent scam indicated that at least one roommate
added the gains to his “net worth,” implying that it was available for Kruse to implement at another
time.178 Though it is a much smaller scale, this “reinvestment” parallels how the Poker Processors
and the Poker Companies used the proceeds of the wire and bank fraud to promote illegal gambling
operations179; therefore, it is conceivable that a prosecutor would look at adding the proceeds of a
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specified unlawful activity to the net worth of the enterprise as promotional money laundering
because it was done to help further the specified unlawful conduct. Publicly available information
also indicates that the other roommate may have cashed out the funds, as the Excel Spreadsheet
shows those funds were “sent on n8.”180 It is possible this transfer was intended to conceal or disguise
the nature, the location, the source, the ownership, or the control of the proceeds of specified unlawful
activity,” bringing the transaction under the definition of concealment money laundering.181
As more states move to legalize online poker, there is a non-zero chance that Kruse-like
scandals will happen in the United States. Without proper measures, the risk for bad actors is minimal
compared to the potential reward. Forfeiture of funds or a ban from the site has a minimal deterrent
effect because it is improbable the perpetrators will get caught—recall that Kruse was only caught
because his roommates exposed him.182 The current regulatory environment allows for potentially
uncapped upside rewards. It is time for that to change. The first step to ending the “positive EV
environment” for game theory optimized white-collar criminal activity in online poker requires
amending the UIGEA to punish criminal behavior instead of rewarding it. Ensuring online poker
players can enjoy online poker in an environment as free from fraud requires transparency.
Transparency necessitates a willingness for the two entities with the greatest visibility— poker
companies and poker processors—to cooperate. Cooperation cannot happen for as long as processing
payments for online poker is a prosecutable offense. Several states have taken the first critical steps
to protect players by ensuring interstate cooperation between them and any other like-minded states
willing to legalize online poker.
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The fall of criminal activity under an amended UIGEA
Shortly after Black Friday, some state lawmakers quickly went to work behind the scenes to
restore access to online gambling. In 2012, Delaware became the first state to legalize online
poker,183 and Nevada quickly followed.184 On October 5, 2017, then-Governor of New Jersey, Chris
Christie, signed the Multi-State Internet Gaming Agreement (MSIGA), making New Jersey the
newest Member State, joining the founding Member States, Delaware, and Nevada. 185 Two other
states, Pennsylvania, having amended its iGaming bill, H271,186 and Michigan, made online poker
accessible to its residents but have not yet joined The Multi-State Internet Gaming Agreement. 187
Online poker is approved in Massachusetts and West Virginia but is not yet accessible to residents. 188
New York, Connecticut, Kentucky, and Virginia have introduced bills to legalize online poker, but
the bills have not been brought to a vote.189
The MSIGA provides a framework for modifying the UIGEA to regulate online poker in the
United States that focuses on player protection measures that deter white-collar criminal activity
amongst the player pool. There are several ways that players benefit from regulatory oversight the
MSIGA provides. The MSIGA requires online poker sites to prove they have a secure system to hold
player funds and are able to timely process payments to players. 190 Additionally, the MSIGA requires
careful monitoring of the sites for responsible gaming protocols—including means to deter underage
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access and help for gambling addicts—as well as protocols for game fairness and severe
consequences for transgressions.191
The MSIGA’s authors crafted the agreement in a manner that speaks to the very nature of the
UIGEA’s misguided purpose. Recall that Section 5362(10)(A) of the UIGEA limits “unlawful
Internet gambling” to placing, receiving, or transmitting a bet or wager that involves the Internet
where “such bet or wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the State or Tribal
lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received, or otherwise made.” 192 Making online poker
legal in their respective states, the Member States are outside the scope of Section 5362(10)(B) of
the UIGEA because “the bet or wager is initiated and received or otherwise made exclusively within
a single [Member] State” where it is “expressly authorized by and placed in accordance with the laws
of such [Member] State.”193 Moreover, as the Court in New Hampshire Lottery Commission v. Barr
held, “the four prohibitions in § 1084(a) [ ] apply only to bets or wagers on a sporting event or
contest.”194 On appeal, the First Circuit Court concluded the prohibitions section 1084(a) applied
only to the interstate transmission of wire communications related to any sporting event or contest, 195
all but ending the DOJ’s 2018 memorandum opinion that concluded the prohibitions of the Wire Act
“are not uniformly limited to gambling on sporting events or contests.” 196
Another critical, forward-thinking aspect of the MSIGA is that the agreement allows other
States to join “by any means authorized by the laws of any such State, as long as such State agrees
to act in accordance with the terms of [the] Agreement,” and at least two-thirds of the current Member
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States vote to accept the new Member State. 197 Upon satisfying the requirements outlined in Articles
VI and XI, other states have an open invitation to join the agreement if that State’s legislation
permits.198 With each additional Member State, the UIGEA’s domestic enforceability is threatened.
Amending the UIGEA to meet “[t]he American commitment to the rule of law [so] that every citizen
is governed by the same laws, applied through a fair and equal judicial process to resolve disputes
peacefully”199 will give the statute an enforceable purpose that will better serve online poker players
going forward.
Currently, online poker sites recognize RTA as a threat only in the context of reputational
harm to their business model. In September 2020, GGPoker responded to the Fedor Kruse scandal,
announcing on its blog that it banned thirteen accounts for using RTA and returned $1,175,305 to
players, with an additional twenty-seven accounts banned with no confiscation of funds. 200 GGPoker
also announced that it implemented a community-focused reporting system allowing players to
report suspicious activity during gameplay but will not publicize an investigation’s details unless
circumstances warrant it.201
GGPoker’s position, while a step in the right direction, ignores monetary harm players face
in a misfocused and improperly regulated environment. The UIGEA should be amended to provide
federal regulations that focus on unlawful player actions instead of incriminating payment
processors. Doing so can be accomplished through three reasonable measures: First, website servers
must be located inside the United States. With the website servers based in the United States, players
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can have confidence the United States will have jurisdiction over the sites because the activity
originates from a place where U.S. law is applicable.
Second, require websites located extraterritorially seeking access to the U.S market to apply
for and to receive a gaming license. Bringing the sites under the purview of the Gaming Control
Board (GCB) will add a layer of oversight from a regulatory body familiar with implementing and
enforcing player protections and game integrity measures. Moreover, the GCB should be authorized
to revoke licenses and report unlawful activity to the appropriate authorities. The authority to revoke
licenses gives online poker sites exposure to significant financial loss should they lose their gaming
license because they did not abide by the regulations. The risk of ruin will also promote cooperation
and a more open reporting process for handling players who violate terms of service agreements.
Third, poker sites with gross annual gaming revenue (GAFR) exceeding $1,000,000 should
be considered a financial institution under 31 CFR 1010.100(f)(5) 202 and 31 CFR 1010.100(f)(6).203
Courts in the United States have held that online poker accounts do not fall within the definition of
a “bank, securities, or other financial account” because the poker sites were not “establish[ed] for the
custody, loan, exchange, or issue of money, for the extension of credit, [or] for facilitating the
transmission of funds.”204 Classifying player accounts and the online poker company’s accounts as
banking accounts will bring them under the jurisdiction of the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (FinCEN). FinCEN is a division of the United States Treasury with a mission to “safeguard
the financial system from illicit use, combat money laundering and its related crimes.” 205 Under
FinCEN’s jurisdiction, bad actors run a greater risk of getting caught, disincentivize many of the
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financial crimes the NGIC and Congress raised concerns for years ago. Additionally, it will deter
crimes such as a tax evasion and tax fraud, referenced in the money laundering statutes. 206
Fourth, require liquidity pooling for extraterritorial sites that do not have U.S.-based business
locations that also requires offshore online poker sites to hold U.S. player funds in an U.S-based
bank account. With the risk of asset forfeiture for failing to comply with U.S. law, online poker sites
found in violation of the law face the additional risk of reputational harm. Fear of economic damage
and the threat of reputational harm will incentivize offshore and U.S.-based online poker sites to
cooperate with investigations and help ensure all players have a fair gaming experience.
CONCLUSION
An updated UIGEA that speaks to protecting players and punishing those who violate the law
better serves the needs of the American people. The UIGEA will become increasingly ineffective in
its current form as more states opt to join the MSIGA and tap into the growing taxable revenue
generated from the Internet gambling market. Simultaneously, players in most remaining states will
continue to legally access offshore online poker sites and be forced to expose themselves to greater
risk than their neighbors for engaging in the same lawful activity.
These concepts are not new, they have existed since the two weeks that followed Black
Friday, when Gary Loveman, Chief Executive Officer and President of Caesar’s Entertainment wrote
a column suggesting how to regulate online poker. 207 Loveman raised a salient point—because of
the ban on Internet poker, “[b]usiness [was] being diverted from legitimate, respected companies that
employ[ed] thousands of people to fly-by-night, underground (and in this case, foreign)
operations.”208 Regulating online poker will give Americans the freedom to play online poker from
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their homes while creating taxable revenue here in the United States. 209 Federal regulation could
prevent criminal activity by protecting players from cheating, fraud, and identity theft. 210
In the opening moments of the poker movie, “Rounders,” Matt Damon’s character, Mike
McDermott, uttered the phrase, “Listen, here's the thing. If you can't spot the sucker in the first half
hour at the table, then you are the sucker.” 211 It is time Congress re-examine the UIGEA and update
it to ensure the United States protects U.S-based online poker players and gamblers from foreign and
domestic scammers and fraudsters willing to exploit the ambiguities and gaps in the law. Until then,
U.S.-based online players are the suckers at the table.
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